The French Parliamentary Permacrisis: The Dawn of a Fresh Governmental Era
In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive British prime minister to take up the role in six years.
Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this represented unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is unfolding in France, now on its fifth premier in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?
The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his government’s survival.
But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.
Minority Rule
Key background: from the moment Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – left, the far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.
Simultaneously, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.
Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.
In mid-September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.
So much so that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.
A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for another 48 hours in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.
Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were early elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier two days later.
Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.
With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those ballots, due on Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”
A Cultural Shift
The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.
A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR seek his removal.
To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, finished.
Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.
So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.
Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his replacement would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.
Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.
Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.
“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”